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NOTES AND COMMENTS
fessor John P. Dalzell, Assistant to the Solicitor, Department of the
Interior, Washington, D. C. Professor Frank W. Hanft, Major, Army
Specialists Corps, now in training for military government, Charlottes-
ville, Va. Professor M. T. Van Hecke, Regional Director, National
War Labor Board, Atlanta, Ga.
During the Summer Session of 1943 at the Law School of the Uni-
versity of North Carolina Judge J. Warren Madden, of the United
States Court of Claims, gave the course in Labor Law. Dean Robert
H. Wettach has been serving as Public Panel Member for the Regional
War Labor Board.
The executives of the Editorial Staff of the NORTH CAROLINA LAW
REVIEW for 1943-44 are: William A. Johnson, Editor-in-Chief, John F.
Shuford and Cecil J. Hill, Associate Editors. They are likewise the
recipients of the faculty research assistantships for the current year.
John T. Kilpatrick, Jr. and Fred R. Edney, Jr. were elected last
spring to the honorary Law School society of the Order of the Coif.
Of last year's editorial staff the following are in military service:
C. D. Hogue, Jr., Arthur C. Jones, Jr., Wallace C. Murchison and H.
Milton Short, Jr.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Domestic Relations-Work and Labor-Contracts Between Persons
Living in a Family Relationship
Plaintiff, daughter-in-law of the defendant's intestate, and her hus-
band moved into the home of her father-in-law in June, 1929. In
March, 1936, the father-in-law suffered a stroke of paralysis, causing
a gradual deterioriation in his health until his death in 1941. During
the period of illness the plaintiff acted as housekeeper-nurse for her
father-in-law, doing such menial tasks as washing his bed clothes two
or three times weekly, bathing him, giving him medicine, and preparing
a special diet. There was no express contract to pay for these services
between the parties, but the father-in-law said in plaintiff's presence that
he expected her to be paid out of his estate after his death., Plaintiff
brought an action against the administrators of her father-in-law's
estate to recover for the value of her services rendered during the ill-
ness on the basis of an implied contract to pay. The defendants argued
that such services were rendered by a person living in a family re-
lationship and, therefore, were gratuitous. The court held there was
sufficient evidence of an implied contract to allow plaintiff to recover.2
'Francis v. Francis, 223 N. C. 401, 26 S. E. (2d) 907 (1943), Record on Ap-
peal, 20-29.
, Francis v. Frands, 223 N. C. 401, 26 S. E. (2d) 907 (1943).
1943]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Generally, where one voluntarily accepts the benefits of services
performed in his behalf, he ratifies the act of the party performing them
and bec6mes liable to him for the reasonable value thereof.3 The rule
does not usually apply to services rendered between persons living in
a family relationship, regardless of the kinship between the parties. The
law presumes that services are performed freely because of the desire
to promote family interest and goodwill when performed between hus-
band and wife,4 parent-in-law and child-in-law,5 uncle and nephew,0
brother and brother,7 parent and child,s stepfather and stepchild,O* or
even strangers living in the family relationship. 10 It is essential in the
above relationships that the parties live together as a family."l*
It must be noted, however, that kinship alone does not create a pre-
sumption of gratuitous service.12  Where the parties do not live to-
gether in the family relationship, the presumption of the gratuitous
nature ceases to exist, or is greatly weakened, according to the prox-
imity of relationship and the nature of the services performed.13
The presumption of gratuity may be overcome by proof either of
an express agreement to pay, or of such facts and circumstances as
satisfactorily show that both parties at the time expected payment to
be made, thus giving rise to an implied contract.1 4* Where the family
relationship exists, the claimant has the burden of refuting the pre-
sumption and proving the existence of an express or implied under-
8 Shippen v. Walker, 26 Ga. App. 280, 105 S. E. 853 (1921); Winkler v.
Killian, 141 N. C. 575, 54 S. E. 540 (1906) ; 28 R. C. L. 668, §3.
'Coleman v. Burr, 93 N. Y. 17, 45 Am. Rep. 160 (1883).
'See Brown v. McCurdy, 278 Pa. 19, 22, 122 Atl. 169, 170 (1923).
'Bolling v. Bolling's Adm'r, 146 Ky. 313, 142 S. W. 387 (1912).
"Hodge v. Hodge, 47 Wash. 196, 91 Pac. 764 (1907).
'See Thysell v. McDonald, 134 Minn. 400, 402, 159 N. W. 958, 959 (1916);
Williams v. Halford, 73 S. C. 119, 53 S. E. 88 (1905) (illegitimate children).
*See Sargent v. Foland 104 Ore. 296, 308, 207 Pac. 349, 352 (1922) (The
mere relationship of stepfather and stepchild does not raise the presumption of
gratuity, for the parent does not have to receive the child.).
20 Gjurich v. Feig, 164 Cal. 429, 129 Pac. 464, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 111 (1913).
*The federal rule accords with that of the states: The Morning Star, 1 F.
(2d) 410 (W. D. Wash., 1924).
An interesting point arises in the case of bigamous marriages. In Cooper v.
Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N. E. 892, 9 Am. St. Rep. 721 (1888) the court held
that one could not recover against an administrator for services rendered during
a bigamous marriage. North Carolina has taken a contrary view on another
ground. In Sanders v. Ragan, 172 N. C. 612, 90 S. E. 777 (1916) the court held
that a woman, innocently believing that she was becoming a lawful wife, was en-
titled to recover, by reason of a fraud practiced upon her, the value of her services
above the benefits she may have received in clothes and maintenance.
1 Kerr v. Wilson, 284 Pa. 541, 131 Atl. 468 (1925) ; Gibb's Estate, 266 Pa. 485,
110 Atl. 236 (1920).
"
3Hartley v. Bohrer, 52 Idaho 72, 11 P. (2d) 616 (1932).
14* Einolf v. Thompson, 95 Minn. 230, 103 N. W. 1026 (1905). For a complete
discussion of family contracts see Havighurst, Services in the Home-A Study
of Contract Concepts in Domestic Relations (1932) 41 Yale L. J. 386.
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standing between the parties that a charge for the services was to be
made and to be met by payment.'6
Many elements are considered by the courts in determining the
validity of a contract between persons living in a family relationship.l 6*
While there are varying theories as to presumptions and counterpre-
sumptions, and what evidence rebuts presumptions, and as to the im-
plications to -be drawn from the evidence, the difference is so minute
as to be of no practical value. The difference of opinion is based upon
the court's views as to whether there should be a higher degree of cer-
tainty and definiteness in the evidence in contracts arising in the family
relationship than those arising in the ordinary civil case.17
In proving the validity of a contract the evidence must show some-
thing more than a mere expression of gratitude. In Dowell v. Dowel's
Adsn'r18 two sons, living on their father's farm and reaping the profits
therefrom, endeavored to recover for services rendered the father at
his request prior to his death. The father expressed his appreciation for
the services and promised to pay for them by leaving them his farm at
his death. But his statement at no time amounted to an express prom-
ise on his part to pay for the services, and were not sufficient to consti-
tute an unqualified acknowledgment of an indebtedness on his part for
such services. The court by implication held that such expressions
were merely gratitude, and the free use of the farm afforded ample
compensation.
A mere expectation to pay by the person receiving the benefits does
not create a contract. In Avitt v. Smith19 a mother remarked in the
plaintiff's presence that "she wanted the plaintiff to have sixty acres
of her land in consideration of his taking care of her." The court held
that the old lady's remark showed a "kind disposition," but failed to
show any evidence of a contract or promise to pay. This case is dis-
tinguishable from the Francis case in that there was a reciprocity of
services here. The plaintiff testified that the entire family worked to-
gether: "I (plaintiff) supported them and they supported me."
Justice McIver in Ex parte Aycock 2o seems to have summed up
the requirements in saying: "It must have been the purpose ... to as-
sume a legal obligation, capable of being enforced."
In the case of infants there can be no contract between a parent
and a minor child on a master-servant basis unless the child is shown
"
5Hartley v. Bohrer, 52 Idaho 72, 11 P. (2d) 616 (1932) ; Miller v. Richard-
son 56 S. W. (2d) 614 (St. Louis Ct. of App., Mo., 1933) ; 28 R. C L. 677, §13.0* See (1908) 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 873 for extended annotation on this point.T Ibid. See Bryant v. Fogg, 125 Me. 420, 424, 134 AtI. 510, 512 (1926).
"8137 Ky. 167, 125 S. W. 283 (1910).
19 120 N. C. 392, 27 S. E. 91 (1897).
20 34 S. C. 255, 13 S. E. 450 (1890).
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to have been emancipated, and the burden of proof of emancipation
rests upon the one alleging such.2 '
Although it has been held that in the absence of an express contract
the services are presumed to be gratuitous, 22 the majority of the de-
cisions hold that a contract may be inferred from sufficient facts and
circumstances in the evidence reasonably justifying the inference of an
agreement to pay2s* In Miller v. Richardson 4 the plaintiff cared for
her father after the death of her mother, -doing such menial tasks as
cooking for him, caring for the livestock, and acting as his nurse during
his illness. He gave certain proceeds of his farm to her sporadically.
On various occasions he said in the plaintiff's presence that she was to
be paid well, and the plaintiff had replied: "I expect to be repaid."
The court held that there were sufficient facts and circumstances to
justify the inference of a mutual understanding between the -parties
for an implied contract.
Most courts follow the rule that there must be a reciprocity of bene-
fits or a contract will be implied.25* In cases where the recipient of
services rendered is mentally incapable of making a contract, one is
implied for compensation for services of an unusual and extraordinary
nature.2 6* It is not essential under an implied contract that the amount
of the compensation be agreed upon.27
Many cases arise out of services rendered with the expectation of
2 American Products Co. v. Villwock, 7 Wash. (2d) 246, 109 P. (2d) 570
(1941).22 Baldwin v. Kansas City Rys. Co., 218 S. W. 955 (Kan. City Ct. of App.,
Mo., 1920).
23* McGarvey v. Roods, 73 Iowa 363, 35 N. W. 488 (1887) (Intestate frequently
said that plaintiff should be compensated, that all her property was devoted to
this purpose, and that she had given her other children all that she had intended
to give them. The court held this to be sufficient facts as evidence of an implied
contract.); In re Grogan's Estate, 82 Misc. 555, 145 N. Y. Supp. 285 (1913)(Daughter, at the request of her father cared for him while he gradually became
helpless at the great sacrifice of her own interests and pleasures without compen-
sation therefor.) ; Winkler v. Killian, 141 N. C. 575, 54 S. E. 540 (1906) (Where
a married daughter, living nearby, cared for her mother during old age.) ; Kerr
v. Wilson, 284 Pa. 541, 131 Atl. 468 (1925) (An aged uncle sought a home with
his nephew to care for him in his old age. No services were rendered by him, nor
were any contemplated.).
24 56 S. W. (2d) 614 (St. Louis Ct. of App., Mo., 1933).
23* Marks Adm'r v. Boardman, 89 S. W. 481 (Ky. Ct. of App. 1905) (A sis-
ter cared for her brother at her home, nursing him and performing for him certain
menial services, being only a detriment to her.); accord, Morton v. Ranier, 82
Ill. 215, 25 Am. Rep. 311 (1876) (Nephew lived with uncle, and after majority
furnished his own clothes and paid his own bills.) ; see In re Grogan's Estate, 82
Misc. 555, 145 N. Y. Supp. 285 (1913).
26* Gover's Adm'r v. Waddle, 245 Ky. 652, 54 S. W. (2d) 19 (1932) ; Key v.
Harris, 116 Tenn. 161, 92 S. W. 235 (1905). (The Key Case by way of dicta
suggests that an allowance for services might be sustained on the ground that the
same were necessaries, citing Waldron v. Davis, 70 N. J. L. 788, 58 AtI. 293
(1904). This theory is weakened in the Key Case, since the parties in Waldron
v. Davis were not living in a family relationship.) "
"' See McGarvey v. Roods, 73 Iowa 363, 35 N. W. 488 (1887).
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being paid by provision in a will. If such a provision is made and the
will is later destroyed, there is sufficient evidence of an agreement to
pay and to be paid; and the claimant does not have to wait until death
to bring an action for recovery.28 Where the testator has made it im-
possible to fulfill the contract by conveying substantial portions of the
property to other parties, the one rendering the services can still re-
cover for the reasonable value thereof under the common counts.2 9
In the Francis0 case it would have been manifestly unjust to pre-
vent recovery by the presumption of gratuity. The absence of a reci-
procity of benefits is evidence that the plaintiff did not intend gratuity,
and the statement by deceased that he expected plaintiff to be paid out
of his estate adquately shows an implied contract.
CEcIL J. HILL.
Garnishment-Bank Directors--Bank Stock
Action by M, judgment creditor, to garnish $1,000 worth of bank
stock deposited with defendant bank by its owner, a director of the
bank, as required by a state statute1 From a holding that the bank
stock was exempt from garnishment, and an order discharging the
bank as garnishee, M appeals. Held, one judge dissenting, reversed.
The bank stock is subject to garnishment.2
This case squarely presents the question of whether or not bank
stock owned by a judgment debtor, and held by the bank, to qualify
him as a director in the bank can be garnished. It appears that the
rule was well settled at common law that stock in a corporation was not
subject to attachment or garnishment. This rule was based on the
theory that choses in action could not be attached and in those states
allowing attachment or garnishment of choses in action corporate stock
could not be garnisheed unless the statute provided for it,3 and the
courts made no distinction between bank stock and any other corporate
stock in applying this rule. However, it, like so many other common
law rules, has been displaced by statute, in most states, which ex-
pressly or impliedly provide, or have been construed by the courts to
provide that shares of stock in a corporation may be attached or gar-
8 "Einolf v. Thompson, 95 Minn. 230, 103 N. W. 1026 (1905).
" Patterson v. Franklin, 168 N. C. 75, 84 S. E. 18 (1915) ; accord, Messier v.
Messier, 34 R. I. 233, 82 Ati. 996 (1912).
" Francis v. Francis, 223 N. C. 401, 26 S. E. (2d) 907 (1943).
ILL STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd, 1934) c. 1632, §4.
'Molner v. South Chicago Savings Bank, 138 F. (2d) 201 (C. C. A. 7th,
1943).
84 Am. JuR. (1936), Attachment & Garnishment, §351; 10 FLETCHER, PRIVATE
CORPORATIONs (perm. ed. 1931) §4759; cf. Elgart v. Mintz, 123 N. J. E. 404, 197
Atl. 747 (Ch. 1938) ; Lambert v. Huff, A. & T. Co., 82 W. Va. 362, 95 S. E. 1031(1918).
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nished. The statutes nor the courts do not appear to distinguish be-
tween bank stock or any other form of corporation stock. As a result
the generally accepted view today is that shares of stock in a corporation
are subject to attachment or garnishment just as any other property
or claims which the judgment debtor has.4 It must be remembered,
however, that the right to attach or garnish shares of stock, if it exists
at all, depends on and is measured by the statute.5
The case which we have before us differs from the usual one in-
volving attachment or garnishment of stock shares in that the stock
sought to be garnished was owned by the director and held by the
bank pursuant to a state statute. The relevant part of this statute
reads thus: "Every director of any bank .. .must own in his own
right, free from lien or encumberance, shares of the capital stock of
the bank ... of which he is a director, the aggregate par value of which
shall not be less than one thousand dollars ($1,000) and the stock cer-
tificates evidencing . . . (such shares) shall be filed unendorsed and
unassigned by him with the cashier of such bank during his term as
director. Any director who ceases to be the owner of capital of such
bank.., of the aggregate par values of one thousand dollars ($1,000)
or becomes in any form disqualified, shall vacate his place as such di-
rector."6  Does the presence of this statute have any effect on the
general rule, or does it warrant a holding that the stock is not garnish-
able?
The correct answer to this query would seem to depend upon the
question of what is the proper construction of the statute and the ap-
plicability and effect of certain principles of the law of garnishment.
Most of the states have statutes similar to the Illinois statutes requir-
ing that bank directors own stock in the bank of which they are a
director,r* but it appears to be the only one which requires that the
"Alexander v. Livestock National Bank, 282 Ill. App. 315 (1935), (1936) 3U. CHL L. REV. 511; 4 Amr. Jut. (1936), Attachment & Garnishment, §351; 10
FLrcnER, PIvATE CoapoRaTioNs (perm. ed. 1931) §4759.
'4 Am. JuR. (1936), Attachment & Garnishment, §351; 10 FinrcHER, PRIvATE
CORP0RATioNs (perm. ed. 1931) §4759.
'ILL STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd, 1934) c. 16Y2, §4.
7*The statutes listed in this footnote are grouped, roughly though not com-
pletely accurately, according to the amount of stock which a bank director in
that state must own. (1) $200 par value bank stock: ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie,
1940) tit. 5, §185; Miss. CODE ANN. (1930) §3805. (2) $500 par value bank stock:
ARIz. CODE ANN. (1939) §51-219 ($200 if bank is in town of less than 20,000
people); ARic. DIG. STAT. (Pope, 1937) §714; IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) §25-406;
IND. STAT. ANN. (Baldwin, 1934) §18-510 ($1,000 if bank has over $50,000 capital
stock) ; IOWA CODE (Reichmann, 1939) §9217-2 ($200 if bank has less than$30,000 capital stock); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Corrick 1935) §9-104; Ky. REV.STAT. (1942) §287.060(d); MD. CODE ANN. (Flack, 19395 art. 11, §6- N. J. STAT.ANN. (1939) §17: 4-46; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §221(c) ($200 if bank
has less than $15,000 capital stock) ; OHio GEN. CODE.ANx. (Page, 1937) §710-65;
R. I. GEN. LAWS ANN. (1938) §132-1; S. D. CODE (1939) §6.0315; UTAH CODEANN. (1943) tit. 7-3-21 ($200 if bank is not in city of first or second class). (3)
[Vol. 22
NOTES AND COMMENTS
stock be deposited with anyone, bank official or otherwise. The pres-
ence of this factor might seem to lessen the value of a discussion of
this problem since the question of garnishment can arise only when
property of the judgment debtor is in the hands of a third party. How-
ever, in those states which do not have provisions similiar to those
embodied in the Uniform Stock Transfer Acts the problem before us
could arise, for in the absence of such provisions for attachment and
levy the common law rule that stock could be reached by garnishment
proceedings against the corporation would apply. Also, it appears that
even in those states having the Uniform Stock Transfer Act a judg-
ment creditor could, by first securing an injunction against the transfer
of the stock, resort to garnishment against the corporation to satisfy
his claim.9 Further, if the creditor resorted to a direct proceeding
against the debtor his rights to the stock would depend on the debtor's
rights since his rights should be no greater than those of the debtor.
The widespread policy of requiring bank directors to own a stipu-
lated amount of stock in the bank of which they are a director is de-
scribed thus by Morse in his work on Banks and Banking: "A method
frequently resorted to for securing the fidelity of directors in the exer-
cise of their duties is to require them to own in their own right and
unencumbered a certain number of the shares of the corporation."' 1
$1,000 par value bank stock: IL&. STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd, 1934) c. 1632, §4;
MASS. ANN. LAws (Michie, Supp. 1942) c. 172A, §3; Mic. STAT. ANN. (Hender-
son, 1936) §23.19 ($300 if bank has less than $25,000 capital stock) ; MINx. STAT.
(Mason, 1927) §7670 ($500 if bank has less than $25,000 capital stock) ; MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) §6014.15; NEv. Comp. LAws (Hillyer,
1929) §659; N. Y. BANKING LAW §116; OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1943) tit. 6, §94($500 if bank has capital stock of less than $25,000) ; Tax. ANN. REv. Civ. STAT.
Vernon, 1925) art. 388 ($500 if bank has capital stock of less than $17,500);
Wyo. REv. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1931) §10-209 (Savings Associations). (4)
Shares of stock of no certain value: COLO. STAT. ANN. (Michie, 1935) c. 18, §12(5 shares if bank has capital stock of less than $30,000; 10 shares if capital stock
is over $30,000); DEr- REv. CODE (1935) §2305 (No specified number of shares
required) ; Mo. STAT. ANN. (1932) p. 7585, §5363 (2 shares if bank has capital
stock of less than $25,000; 5 shares if capital stock is over $25,000) ; N. M. STAT.
ANN. (1941) §52-208 (10 shares) ; S. C. CODE (1942) §7748 (10 shares) ; WASH.
Ray. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932) §3237 (5 shares if bank has capital stock
of less than $50,000; if over $50,000, 10 shares); (5) Miscellaneous: NED. Com,.
LAWS (Dorsey, 1929) §8-121 (Each director must own stock equal to 4% of the
capital stock of the bank if the capital stock is less than $50,000; $3,000 worth
of stock if capital stock of the bank is more than $50,000) ; PA. STAT. ANN.
(Purdon, 1930) tit. 7, §819 ($3,000 worth of stock) ; VA. CODE ANN. (Michie &
Sublett, 1937) §4149(19) ($100 worth of stock for each $10,000 worth of capital
stock if capital stock of bank is less than $50,000; $500 for each $10,000 worth of
capital stock of capital stock is over $50,000 and less than $100,000; $750 for each
$10,000 worth of capital stock if total capital stock is more than $100,000 and
less than $300,000; $1,000 for each $10,000 worth of capital stock if total capital
stock is more than $300,000).
8 6 U. L. A. §13.
" Rioux v. Cronin, 222 Mass. 131, 109 N. E. 898 (1915) ; cf. Elgart v. Mintz,
124 N. J. E. 136, 200 Ad. 488 (Ch. 1938).101 MoRsE, BANKS & BANKING (6th ed. 1928) §138.
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This seems to be a fairly accurate description of the purpose of such
statutes. Since the amount of stock which these statutes require a di-
rector to own would almost invariably constitute only a small percent
of the total liability of the bank it is doubted if the legislatures intended,
by such statutes, to provide a fund out of which those holding claims
against the bank, in case of insolvency, could be indemnified. The
applicability of this observation to the Illinois statute is borne out by
the fact that the amount of stock which a director is required to own
does not vary, regardless of the size of the bank.l* Furthermore, in
the event that the bank should collapse, the shares themselves would be
practically worthless with the result that creditors of the bank could
realize very little or, more likely nothing from them. Of course, in the
event that a director did some act for which he was liable to a still
solvent bank such a deposit would provide an easily accessible source
of indemnification up to the value of the director's stock. Even so,
had the purpose of the statute been to provide an indemnity fund it
seems that the legislature would not only have required that a much
larger amount of stock be owned by the director, but also that there
be a close ratio between the amount of stock the directors must own
and the size of the bank. The wording of the statute fails to indicate
that it has any purpose other than to curtail improper and unwise acts
by the directors by the expedient of.requiring them to own stock in
the bank in the hope that such will give them a personal interest that
they might not have otherwise and thereby more nearly assure that the
directors will discharge their duties faithfully and with the best in-
terests of the bank in mind. The situation before us is not at all analo-
gous to the one presented by an attempt to garnish a bond deposited
with a state officer, pursuant to a statute, by an insurance company
doing business within the state.12 * Such a bond is in the hands of a
state official, usually the treasurer, and therefore is not subject to gar-
nishment since it is considered to be in the hands of the law.' 3 Further,
such statutes usually state that the bond is held as indemnity for the
citizens of the state to whom the insurance company may be liable.
It has been held that such bonds are not subject to attachment or gar-
nishment.14 Such a holding seems to be entirely consistent with the
purpose of the statute.
1* Some states do make a variation in the amount of stock a director must
own depending on the size of the bank of which he is a director. But in no
instance, except possibly Virginia, is the amount required of a size that would
indicate that the purpose of the requirement was to provide an indemnity fund.
See note 8 supra.
12* Defendant in the present action argued that it was an analogous situation.
For an example of a statute of this type see VA. CoDE ANN. (Michie & Sublett,
1936) §4201.
" 4 Am. Jup. (1936), Attachment & Garnishment, §386 et. seq.
"t Buck v. Gurantors' Liability Indemnity Co., 97 Va. 719, 34 S. E. 950 (1900).
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One of the most important aspects of this problem is the question
of whether or not the director is free to resign at will, for, as it will
appear later, the judgment debtor's, and thus the creditor's, rights in
this stock will depend on whether or not he could resign from his posi-
tion as director whenever he desired. Since the statute is silent on
this proposition its determination depends on the construction to be
given the statute. The statute provides that the directors are elected
to serve as "managers for one year and until their successors are
elected,"' 15 but this does not provide a basis for a holding, one way or
the other, on this point. Thus we must look to the general rules gov-
erning the right of a director to resign. It is a well established prin-
ciple that directors of a corporation are free to resign at will, provided
there is nothing to the contrary in the charter or by-laws of the cor-
poration or a statute ;16 and it does not matter what form the resigna-
tion takes provided that the charter or by-laws, or a statute, do not
require it to follow a prescribed form.17 This rule applies to bank
directors just as to any corporation directors.ls* Unless the resigna-
tion is worded to take effect only upon acceptance, there is a vacancy
of the office as soon as notice of the resignation is communicated to the
proper officials, 19 even if the resignation has not been accepted and the
by-laws or charter of the corporation, or a statute,20 require that the
director remain in office until a successor is duly elected and qualified.2 1
There are, of course, certain instances in which a director cannot ex-
ercise this privilege,2 2 but it does not appear that there were any such
circumstances in the present case. The absence of any provision in
'1ILr. STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd, 1934) c. 16Y2, §4.18 13 Am. JuR. (1938), Corporations, §883; 2 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
(perm. ed. 1931) §345; for an extended note on this point see: Westwood,
Resignation of Corporate Officers (1936) 22 VA. L. Ray. 527.
"'Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 622 (1941); Bell v. Texas Em-
ployers' Ins. Ass'n., 43 S. W. (2d) 290, 293 (1931) ; 13 Am. JuR. (1938), Cor-
porations, §884; 2 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (perm. ed. 1931) §346.
"*Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U. S. 132, 11 Sup. Ct. 924, 35 L. ed. 662 (1891).
In holding that a director of a national bank was not precluded from resigning
within the year, even though he had been elected for a one year term and until
his successor was elected the court said: "We do not understand that because
§5154 of the Revised Statutes provides that directors shall hold office for one
year, and until their successors have been elected and qualified this prohibited
resignations during the year.... ."1 8 International Bank of St. Louis v. Faber, 86 Fed. 443 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1898);
Lincoln Court Realty Co. v. Kentucky Title, Savings Bank & Trust Co., 169
Ky. 840, 185 S. W. 156 (1916) ; 13 Am. JurL (1938), Corporations, §885.
"Briggs v. Spaulding 141 U. S. 132, 11 Sup. Ct. 924, 35 L. ed. 662 (1891);
Dubois v. Century Cement Products Co., 119 N. J. E. 472, 183 Atl. 188 (1936).
"Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U. S. 132, 11 Sup. Ct. 924, 35 L. ed. 662 (1891);
International Bank of St. Louis v. Faber, 86 Fed. 443 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1898) ; 13
AM. JuR. (1938), Corporations, §886. Contra: Timolat v. Held, 40 N. Y. Supp.
692 (1896).
"' Zeltner v. Zeltner Brewing Co., 174 N. Y. Supp. 338, 66 N. E. 810 (1903);
1 MORAWETZ, CoRPoRArIONS (1852) §563; cf. Carnaghan v. Export & Prod. Oil
Co., 11 N. Y. Supp. 172 (1890).
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the statute regulating the right to resign indicates that the legislature
did not intend to change the general rule as to this right. Thus it is
suggested that the court was correct in proceeding on the theory that
the director was free to resign whenever he desired.
As has already been pointed out the question of the director's right
to resign is closely connected with those principles of garnishment which
are relevant to the problem at hand. It is a cardinal principle of the
law of garnishment that the garnishor has no greater rights against the
garnishee than the judgment debtor would have, 28 except as provided
for by statute2 4 or when there has been fraud affecting the rights of
the creditor with the result that he has equities which lift his rights
above those of the debtor.25 Illinois is in accord with this rule.20 *
Thus it has been held that a garnishee can assert against the garnishor
any defenses that he might have asserted against the judgment debtor,
and if the debtor, at the time of'the answer to the garnishment, could
not recover then the garnishor cannot.27 A further rule of garnishment
" Nrth Chicago Rolling Mill Co. v. Ore & Steel Co., 152 U. S. 596. 14 Sup.
Ct. 710, 38 L. ed. 565 (1894) ; accord, United 'States v. Bank of United States, 5
F. Supp. 942 (S. D. N. Y. 1934); Green v. Green, 108 Colo. 110, 113 P. (2d)
427 (1941) ; Goodwin v. Clayton, 137 N. C. 224, 49 S. E. 175 (1904) ; State Bank
of New Salem v. Schultze, 51 N. D. 66, 199 N. W. 138 (1924).
4 Pullman v. Railway Equipment Co., 73 Ill. App. 313 (1897).2 Jasper Land Co. v. Riddlesperger, 26 Ala. App. 191, 157 So. 231 (1934),
cert. denied, 229 Ala. 331, 157 So. 233 (1934) ; Booker T. Washington Burial Ins.
Co. v. Roberts, 228 Ala. 206, 153 So. 409 (1934) ; Fosdick v. Robertson, 91 Conn.
571, 100 At. 1059 (1917) ; Crane v. Illinois Merchant's Trust Co., 238 Ill. App.
257 (1925).
"*Schmitz v. 75th & Exchange Drug Co., 303 Ill. App. 192, 196, 24 N. E. (2d)
889, 891 (1940) where the court said: "It is a well established rule that the credi-
tor stands in exactly the same attitude in relation to a garnished fund that thejudgment debtor does, and can enforce only such rights as the debtor might en-
force. The right of the creditor against the garnishee cannot, by garnishment,
rise higher than the right of the debtor against the garnishee. If the right of
debtor is subject to the right of the garnishee, the right of the creditor is subject
to the same right. The one exception of this rule occurs when there has been
a fraudulent transfer of property."; Patton v. Washington Ins. Exchange, 288
Ill. App. 594, 6 N. E. (2d) 472 (1937); Matton Grocery Co. v. Struckmeyer &
Olson. 326 Ill. 602, 158 N. E. 422 (1927); Hibernian Banking Ass'n. v. Marrison,
188 11. 279, 58 N. E. 296 (1899); Supreme Sitting, Order of Iron Hall, v.
Grigsby, 178 Ill. 522, 47 N. E. 855, 59 Am. St. Rep. 309 (1897).2 Chicago Ridirg Club for Use of Klein v. Avery, 305 Ill. App. 419, 27 N. E.
(2d) 636 (1940); First Nat. Bank v. Hanhemann Institutions of Chicago, 356
Ill. 366, 190 N. E. 707 (1934) ; Schneider v. Autoist Mut. Ins. Co., 346 Ill. 137,
178 N. E. 466 (1931); Dennison v. Taylor, 142 Ill. 45, 31 N. E. 148 (1892);
accord, Zink v. Black Star Line, Inc., 18 F. (2d) 156 (App. D. C. 1927), cert.
denied, 275 U. S. 527, 48 Sup. Ct. 20, 72 L. ed. 408 (1927) ; Fidelity Trust Co. v.
New York Finance Co., 125 Fed. 275 (C..C. A. 3rd, 1903); First Security Bank
of Pocatello v. Zaring Farm & Livestock Co., 51 Idaho 700, 10 P. (2d) 303
(1932) ; Paul Davis Dry Goods Co. v. Paul, 205 Iowa 491, 218 N. W. 276 (1928) ;
Scurry v. Quaker Oats Co., 201 Iowa 1171, 208 N. W. 860 (1926); Gentry v.
Le Clair, 120 Kan. 183, 250 Pac. 257 (1926); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Commercial
Credit Co. 252 Ky. 539, 67 S. W. (2d) 676 (1934); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
v. Hightower, 211 Ky. 36, 276 S. W. 1063, 44 A. L. R. 1158, 1161 (1925) ; Silver-
man v. Grinell, 165 La. 587, 115 So. 789 (1928); Employers Liability Assur.
Corp. Limited v. Perkins, 169 Md. 269, 181 Atl. 436 (1935); Braniff Inv. Co. v.
Carter, 118 Okla. 599, 75 P. (2d) 439 (1937).
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is the principle that the proceeding will not lie against the garnishee
unless he is indebted to the debtor without contingency or uncertainty
at the date when the answer to the garnishment suit is filed.2 8 If these
principles are applied in the light of the construction that we have
placed on the statute, to wit, that the director was free to resign at will,
then no reason for holding that the stock was not garnishable appears.
If the director can resign whenever it suits his fancy then it can hardly
be argued that he does not have a right to the stock. And since he has
an absolute right to the stock, so does the creditor. If, however, he
cannot resign at will, then it seems that the stock should not be sub-
jected to garnishment for he would have no right to the stock and
neither would his creditor. One uncertainty that complicates this as-
pect of the matter is the question of whether or not the director's right
to the stock accrues as soon as he resigns. The preceeding remarks
were made on the theory that it did. But if, after his resignation, the
bank had a right to retain the stock until it had been determined that
there was no liability on the part of the director, which would attach
to the stock, then it seems that the stock should not be subjected to
garnishment. In such a case the director would have no right to the
stock until this had been determined; thus the creditor should not be
able to garnish it before that time.
On the basis of these observations it does not seem that there are
any evident reasons to be gained from the statute which free such bank
stock from garnishment. Neither do any of the relevant principles of
garnishment seem to warrant, in view of what we -deem a proper con-
struction of the statute, a contrary decision. Thus it is submitted that
the holding in the instant case is proper and in accord with the general
law of garnishment, even though it does permit a third party to deprive
a bank of a director and a director of his position, irrespective of his
value to the bank. However, it is suggested that the statute involved
could be improved and clarified by certain amendments. It seems that
it would be wise to incorporate into it some definite provision as to
the rights of a director to resign during his term of office. Further-
more, a provision requiring that the stock remain in the hands of the
cashier for a definite period after the director resigned, provided the
right to resign is not abrogated entirely, would be an improvement on
"8 Keck v. Vogt, 108 Colo. 386, 117 P. (2d) 1005 (1941) ; Wetten v. Horix,
309 Ill. App. 535, 33 N. E. (2d) 615 (1941) ; Zimek v. Illinois National Casualty
Co., 370 Ill. 572, 19 N. E. (2d) 620 (1939); Wheeler v. Chicago Title & Trust
Co., 217 Ill. 128, 75 N. E. 455 (1905) ; accord, Malone v. Moore, 204 Iowa 625,
215 N. W. 625, 55 A. L. R. 356, 361 (1927) ; McKnight Co. v. Tomkinson, 209
Minn. 299, 286 N. W. 659 (1941); Salyers Auto Co. v. De Vore, 116 Neb. 317,
217 N. W. 94, 56 A. L. R. 594, 601 (1927); Acheson-Harder Co. v. Western
Wholesale Notions Co., 72 Utah 323, 269 Pac. 1032, 60 A.L.R. 881, 884 (1928);
But cf. Anderson v. Dugger, 130 Kan. 356, 285 Pac. 546 (1930).
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the statute in its present form. Such a provision would eliminate the
possibility of a director doing an act for which he might be liable and
then resigning and withdrawing and disposing of his stock before his
liability attached to it. Also, this would afford some protection to the
bank, its stockholders, and depositors in that it would provide an easily
accessible fund out of which some indemnification could be had in the
event that the director was liable for some act of malfeasance or mis-
feasance during his directorship. In the event that a provision to this
effect was adopted it seems that the stock could not be subjected to
garnishment for the debtor-director, and thus the creditor, would have
no right to the stock until the prescribed period had passed. Also,
until this period had elapsed any claim which the director had on the
stock would be subject to the contingency of whether or not any lia-
bility would be determined, and this would defeat garnishment pro-
ceedings by a creditor.
WILLIAm A. JOHNSON.
